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The Westphalian model and sovereign
equality
PETER M. R. STIRK
Abstract. Although the Westphalian model takes many forms the association of Westphalian
and sovereign equality is a prominent one. This article argues firstly that sovereign equality
was not present as a normative principle at Westphalia. It argues further that while
arguments for sovereign equality were present in the eighteenth century they did not rely on,
or even suggest, a Westphalian provenance. It was, for good reasons, not until the late
nineteenth century that the linkages of Westphalia and sovereign equality became
commonplace, and even then sovereign equality and its linkage with Westphalia were
disputed. It was not until after the Second World War, notably through the influential work
of Leo Gross that the linkage of Westphalia and sovereign equality became not only widely
accepted, but almost undisputed until quite recently. The article concludes by suggesting that
not only did Gross bequeath a dubious historiography but that this historiography is an
impediment to contemporary International Relations.
Peter M. R. Stirk is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International
Aﬀairs at Durham University. His recent publications include Twentieth-Century German
Political Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) and The Politics of
Military Occupation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
The Westphalian model is one of the most widespread and widely accepted
reference points in the study of International Relations. Frequently cursory
allusion to it is taken as suﬃcient to indicate the benchmark against which the
significance of some recent development is to be assessed.1 It even appears almost
in the form of a parody in the titles of journal articles.2 More substantively it
serves as a summary of an international system of some 300 years duration beyond
which the world may now be moving.3 On the other hand, a small group of
historians has denied that this model has much, if anything, to do with the peace
of Westphalia of 1648 from which the model derives its name. This is most
strikingly put in the title of an article by one of these critics, Andreas Osiander:
1 It is almost invidious to single out any particular text but see the important work by Robert Jackson,
The Global Covenant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 385, 398.
2 Thus Simon Philpott, ‘East Timor’s Double Life: Smells Like Westphalian Spirit’, Third World
Quarterly, 27 (2006), pp. 135–59 or, more seriously, Susan Strange, ‘The Westfailure System’, Review
of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 345–54; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Eastphalia as the Perfection of
Westphalia’, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 17 (2010), pp. 27–45.
3 A full list would exhaust the word limit of this article but again a title of a much cited work will
suﬃce: Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds), Beyond Westphalia? (Baltimore: John
Hopkins, 1995).
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‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’.4 While some
have accepted the verdict of the critics and a few have openly rebutted their claims,
most continue to invoke the Westphalian model and its presumed provenance in
the peace of Westphalia of 1648.5 Occasionally the work of these critics is even
referenced for aspects of the historical record while their broader purpose and
critical intent is largely ignored.6
Part of the problem here is that exactly what is being invoked or criticised is
sometimes unclear or is diverse and fluctuating. The Westphalian model sometimes
stands for an account of the presumed basic units of the international system and
the pattern of behaviour they exhibit with varying emphasis upon either the nature
of those units or the international system which induces or compels them to act in
certain ways. From this perspective the emphasis is likely to fall upon the idea of
the existence of territorial states and the balance of power.7 Alternatively, it may
stand for a set of normative assertions. From this perspective the emphasis is likely
to fall upon the ideas of sovereignty, equality and non-intervention.8 Such
normative assertions may be taken to be, or at least to have been, largely
honoured, though never perfectly so. They may also be taken to have been so
systematically violated that they amount to, as the catching subtitle of Krasner’s
study puts it, ‘organized hypocrisy’.9 Somewhere between these two positions, the
model may stand for the collective eﬀort of states to create or impose an
international system and to regulate membership of that system.10
These various positions designate points along a spectrum, clearly distinguish-
able at the extremes but only at the extremes, with most accounts of or allusions
to the Westphalian model fusing explanatory and normative elements. Some such
fusion is inevitable. So far as possible, however, this article will focus on normative
claims about the equality of sovereign states and the linkage of those claims to the
peace of Westphalia. This focus is motivated in part by the fact that it is central
to the most widely cited authority for the Westphalian model, where, that is, it is
thought necessary to cite any authority, namely the 1948 article by Leo Gross.
According to Gross
The Peace of Westphalia, for better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening
of another. It represents the majestic portal which leads from the old into the new world
[. . .] In the political field it marked man’s abandonment of the idea of a hierarchical
structure of society and his option for a new system characterized by a multitude of states,
each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any external
sovereignty.11
4 Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, International
Organization, 55 (2001), pp. 251–87.
5 For a recent explicit rebuttal see Sasson Sofer, ‘The Prominence of Historical Demarcations:
Westphalia and the New World Order’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 20 (2009), pp. 1–19.
6 For example by Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 501–20, apart
from the brief response in a footnote on p. 866.
7 For a classic emphasis on the territorial state see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New
York: Knopf, 1967), p. 264; for the balance of power see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World
Politics (Cambridge University Press 1981), p. 29.
8 See the typical reference to the ‘Westphalian norm of nonintervention’ in J. Bryan Hehir,
‘Intervention: From Theories to Cases’, Ethics and International Aﬀairs, 9 (1993), p. 5.
9 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)
10 See Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 51–70.
11 Leo Gross, ‘The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948’, The American Journal of International Law, 42
(1948), pp. 28–9. Gross’s article is still described as ‘the most authoritative legal commentary on the
treaty’ by Bobbitt, Shield of Achilles, p. 866.
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There are two other reasons for choosing this focus. The first is that it facilitates
addressing the striking neglect of the periodisation of International Rrelations that
has been identified as a weakness by Barry Buzan and Richard Little, albeit not
on the scale of world history which they deal with.12 The point here is to consider
not just when the idea of sovereign equality became a dominant norm but when
it became linked to the peace of Westphalia and why that linkage occurred when
it did and hence what function or purpose was served by that linkage. The second
reason is that while there are good and recent surveys of sovereignty, the same
cannot be said of sovereign equality. Discussion of sovereignty, of course, usually
entails some reference to equality but studies specifically of sovereign equality are
comparatively rare.13
The argument will proceed in the following sections. The first section will argue
that those who negotiated and commented upon the peace of Westphalia in the
seventeenth century did not see it as introducing or consolidating the norm of
sovereign equality. They saw the peace as restorative not innovative. The concept
of sovereignty in something like its modern form was available but not dominant
and the notion of sovereign equality, so far as it was recognised at all, was
explicitly rejected. The normative structure of this world in the eyes of its
inhabitants was hierarchical. The second section considers eighteenth century
perspectives. It will argue that hierarchy was still the dominant motif. The Holy
Roman Empire was still seen as a viable, non-egalitarian structure. The peace of
Westphalia was ascribed some significance but not seen as an epochal turning
point. Stronger advocacy of sovereign equality was evident but it was counterfac-
tual, being far from the prevailing consensus. Moreover its advocates had no need
to turn to the peace of Westphalia to anchor their conception of sovereign equality
and would have weakened the force of their advocacy in their own eyes had they
done so. The third section considers developments from the early nineteenth
century through to the interwar years of the twentieth. It will argue that notions
of sovereign equality were more widespread but still had to contend with the
perceived reality of hierarchy, initially in the form of the Great Power Concert, and
theoretical counter-arguments. Nevertheless, by the turn of the century a conflu-
ence of intellectual and political developments had brought about the linkage of
sovereign equality and the peace of Westphalia, understood as an epochal turning
point. Ironically, it was now possible to look back over the preceding centuries and
see the nineteenth century as an aberration, a period of the attempted assertion of
hierarchy, interrupting a presumed consensus about sovereign equality that dated
back to 1648. The fourth, briefer, section will consider debates surrounding the
creation of the UN and the tercentenary of the peace of Westphalia in which year
Leo Gross published his influential article. It will argue that there was now much
less resistance to the kind of claim he made. The linkage of sovereign equality and
the peace of Westphalia had finally triumphed. Throughout, the arguments of
lawyers, diplomats, publicists and occasionally statesmen will form the sources of
the argument. Lawyers figure prominently because they were more likely to pay
12 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems and World History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
13 As pointed out by Thomas H. Lee, ‘International Law, International Relations Theory and
Preemptive War: The Vitality of Sovereign Equality Today’, Law & Contemporary Problems, 67
(2004), p. 147.
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attention to notions of sovereign equality and lawyers eventually espoused the
linkage, often in clipped formulations of the kind that found their way into Leo
Gross’s article and formed the sources for the claims he made. The conclusion will
suggest the influence of this powerful image of Westphalia and sovereign equality
is not only bad history but is also a hindrance to the contemporary study of
International Relations.
The peace of Westphalia and the seventeenth century
As Christian Reus-Smit and Richard Ned Lebow have argued, seventeenth century
international society, and seventeenth century society more generally, was hier-
archical.14 Social and international standing was central. Defence of honour and
the pursuit of glory were more or less taken for granted. In diplomacy that meant
protracted and bitter disputes over precedence; the negotiations leading up to the
treaties of Osnabrück and Münster provided ample evidence of such behaviour. Of
course, as especially the smaller states sought to enhance their status this could lead
to claims to something that might appear to an expression of a demand for
equality, either with larger states or amongst themselves. The French delegation
complained with evident exasperation, on both counts, of the demands of the
smaller states, especially of ‘their very unjust demands [. . .] desiring to receive from
us the same honours that they grant us [. . .] The Dutch, for example, refuse to see
us if we make any diﬀerence between them and the Venetian delegates. The envoy
of Savoy intends to adopt the same stance if we do not treat him like the Dutch.’15
This was not, however, an equality based upon a general principle but a clamour
by each for enhancement of its own status, preferably at the expense of others, in
an international hierarchy. The extent and limits of Dutch ambition were recorded
in another French note: ‘When we ask them if, therefore, they mean to aspire to
any equality with the king, they say no, but also that we would do them a greater
injustice if we made any diﬀerence between them and Venice or if we introduced
any equality between them and a vassal of the Empire, who recognizes even the
electors as his superiors.’16 According to a modern historian, the Dutch, amongst
the most vociferous in their concern for their own dignity, ‘requested incorporation
into the hierarchy of states in a position immediately below the Emperor and the
kings, but above the electoral princes, dukes and counts’.17
14 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999),
pp. 87–115; Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 262–304.
15 Quoted in Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), p. 84.
16 Osiander, States System of Europe, pp. 84–5.
17 Thus Simon Groenveld, ‘The Treaty of Münster as the Culmination of a Progressive Revolution’,
in Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (eds), 1648. War and Peace in Europe. Essay Volume 1.
Politics, Religion, Law and Society (Münster: Westfälisches Landesmuseum, 1998), p. 129. On these
issues more widely, under the subheading ‘The great preoccupation; ceremonial and procedure’, see
M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 56–68.
This is not inconsistent with Dutch insistence on equality with Spain, their former overlord from
whom they sought independence after eighty years of intermittent war.
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As already indicated the settlement was perceived as restorative not innovative.
According to Osiander, ‘[t]here was a consensus [. . .] that the settlement should
bring a return to the status quo ante bellum’.18 Appeal to tradition was a common,
and often eﬀective, rejoinder to such innovations as were suggested. The French,
for example, sought to smuggle in a significant change, abolishing the election of
an emperor-designate in the lifetime of the existing ruler on the pretence that this
was compatible with tradition, only for the German Electors to dismiss the
suggestion as blatantly contrary to tradition.19 Insofar as one can discern some
sense of innovation, namely in restricting the rights of rulers to determine the
religion of their subjects, the treaties can only be seen as an impediment to their
authority.20
It has been claimed that Article 64 of the Treaty of Münster is ‘remarkable in
its sweep’ in that, by recognising the rights of the states to conclude alliances with
other states outside the Empire, ‘the article recognized a crucial prerogative of
independent, sovereign states’.21 Yet this claim is faulty on two grounds. In the first
place, it is faulty because this was not a new right at all but one of the rights which
was being reaﬃrmed.22 It is faulty more importantly because it presumes a linkage
between a right to conclude treaties, the state and sovereignty which was far from
established in the middle of the sixteenth century. As the German historian
Hainhard Steiger has pointed out ‘Sovereignty was not, in 1648, the presupposition
of capacity in international law and membership in a European order of states.’23
Indeed, at this point, even beyond the confines of the Empire, capacity in
international law was so far from being a monopoly of states that it could be
recognised as adhering to the great trading companies, including the rights to
conclude treaties, make war and conquer territory.24 Against this backcloth, in
which states were far from having such a monopoly, in law as well as fact,
deducing sovereignty from the possession of one of these rights is simple
anachronism.
Something similar can be said for the term and concept of sovereignty itself.
The concept in something akin to its modern form was known but not necessarily
accepted as universally applicable. Indeed according to Derek Croxton, amongst
the negotiators in Münster and Osnabrück, the French alone had a clear concept
of sovereignty but were not inclined to extend it to the others, save for tactical
reasons.25 In the latter case, when the French did suggest insertion into the treaties
18 Osiander, States System of Europe, p. 44.
19 Osiander, States System of Europe, p. 45.
20 This restriction was not accepted as applying to the hereditary lands of the Emperor. See Article 5
of the Treaty of Osnabrück.
21 Thus Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 85.
22 Osiander, ‘Sovereignty’, p. 273. See also, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden
und das Bündnisrecht der Reichstände’, Der Staat, 8 (1969), pp. 449–78.
23 Heinhard Steiger, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden – Grundgesetz für Europa?’, in H. Duchhardt (ed.), Der
Westfälische Frieden (Oldenbourg: Historische Zeitschrift, Beihefte 26, 1998), pp. 68–9. For the
complications see also the discussion of the right to send legations in, Johann Wolfgang Textor,
Synopsis of the Law of Nations [1680] vol. 2 (Washington: Carnegie, 1916), pp. 138–9.
24 See Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994), pp. 35–6. See also, A. H. L. Heeren, A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe
and its Colonies (London: Bohn, 1873), p. 160.
25 Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty’, The International
History Review, 21 (1999), pp. 587–8.
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of a reference to ‘tous les autres droits de Souveraineté’ the oﬀer was declined.26 The
Latin term that appeared in the treaties, in provisions relating to the aﬀairs of the
Holy Roman Empire, not Europe as a whole, was ‘ius territoriale’, translated into
German as Landeshoheit, as ‘Territorial Right in an English translation of 1710,
and, more literally as ‘territorial jurisdiction’.27 These distinctions are not
terminological quibbles. They are diﬀerent attempts to capture an evolving package
of rights, about which there is some disagreement, though it is clear that
Landeshoheit did not amount to sovereignty. According to the later German
constitutional theorist, Herbert Krüger, the term indicated ‘the sum of powers of
domination, which is united in the hands of a territorial lord’, whose individual
powers were characterised by the term Regalien. Between these individual Regalien,
there was no ‘logical or inherent connection’. Attempts to induce some kind of
conceptual order did not extend beyond distinctions between higher and lower
Regalien.28 Only in retrospect did Landeshoheit come to be seen as something more
coherent, as ‘the entire extent of that which belongs to the government of a
territory’.29 Even that understanding of Landeshoheit did not amount to sover-
eignty as was acknowledged by those who put it forward.
In conclusion, there was little trace of sovereign equality in the peace of
Westphalia or indeed of a modern conception of sovereignty at all. The peace itself
was restorative not innovative in the eyes of its creators. Contemporaries were
aware of the centrifugal tendencies in the Empire. After the devastation of the
Thirty Years War they could hardly be unaware of them. But they did not approve
of such tendencies, let alone justify them by reference to a conception of sovereign
equality.30
Eighteenth century views
The eighteenth century saw a diminution in the obsessive concern with precedence
and ceremony evident in the negotiations leading to the peace of Westphalia. Even
from the perspective of the late eighteenth century, however, it appeared that the
‘time is not, however, long past, since the diﬀerent Courts of Europe plunged into
the warmest altercations on this account, and have quarrelled like madmen, or
pouted like children, not because their Equality was invaded, but because their
pre-eminence was not allowed’.31 Eighteenth century society was still predominantly
26 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Die verfassungs- und völkerrechtsgeschichtliche Bedeutung de Westfälsichen
Friedens von 1648’, in Ingo Erberich et al. (eds), Frieden und Recht (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1998),
pp. 29–30. See also, Steiger, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden’, p. 68.
27 Various editions of the treaties are available at: {http://www.pax-westphalica.de/ipmipo/index.html}.
For the literal translation see Osiander, ‘Sovereignty’, p. 272.
28 Herbert Krüger, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964), pp. 824–5.
29 Thus the eminent German publicist, Johann Stephan Pütter, writing in 1795, as quoted by
Fassbender, ‘Die verfassungs- und völkerrechtsgeschichtliche Bedeutung’, p. 31. Böckenförde seems
to transpose this later understanding back to 1648, but quotes late eighteenth century sources in
support of the more coherent concept, ‘Der Westfälische Frieden’, pp. 472–3.
30 See Samuel Rachel, Dissertation on the Law of Nature and of Nations [1676] vol. 2 (Washington:
Carnegie, 1916), pp. 224–5. This also applies to Samuel Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007).
31 Robert Ward, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe, vol. 2
(Dublin: Wogan, 1795), p. 219.
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hierarchical. Glory and honour still counted for a great deal. Hierarchy was
assumed to be the normal condition by Prince Kaunitz, Austrian foreign minister
for most of the second half of the century. In his circular note of July 1791, on
the eve of the collapse of the eighteenth century order amidst the French
Revolution, Kaunitz sought to rally ‘the senate of the powers’ in order to shield
their people from ‘the contagion of discontent, insubordination and revolt’ in the
interests of the ‘community of institutions of all kinds, of internal administration,
of gentle and tranquil manners, of enlightened opinion and of a beneficent and
pure religion, which united them all in a single family of nations’.32
Although publicists sought, with some success, to extol the cause of interest
against the passions, as providing a more stable guide for rulers and states, and
although the more specific doctrine of raison d’état was gaining ground, considera-
tions of precedence still impressed themselves upon those who sought to advise their
rulers.33 Near the beginning of the century François Callières, a former French
diplomat, published his De la manière de négocier avec les souverains which became
an instant success and required reading for diplomats for the rest of the century.34
In it, he recalled that ‘Some other crowns attempted, during the negotiation of the
peace of Münster, to introduce a pretended equality among all the Kings of Europe,
but, notwithstanding that innovation, which was ill grounded, and unheard of till
that time, France has remained in possession of its ancient right of pre-eminence
[. . .]’.35 Later he observed that while princes were governed by the same passions as
other men ‘their greatness, and the real eﬀective power which is annexed to their
rank, gives them ideas diﬀerent from those of common mortals’.36 Little had
changed by the middle of the century when Rousset de Missy opened another
highly influential guide to diplomatic practice with the warning that ‘The point of
honour, rank, precedence, are the most delicate article of the political faith. Princes
cede towns, even provinces, but it is not possible with all the skill of the most
adroit negotiators to persuade them to cede a rank which they believe they are
due.’37
Yet the eighteenth century did witness increased advocacy of the principle of
the equality of states. The most influential statement, in the long run, came from
Emer de Vattel:
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and
obligations, as equally proceeding from nature, nations composed of men, and considered
as so many free persons living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and
inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this
32 Alfred Ritter von Viventot, Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs während
der französischen Revolutionskriege 1790–1801, vol. 1 (Vienna: Braumüller, 1873), pp. 208–10.
33 For the contrast between interest and passions more generally see Albert O. Hirschman, The
Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); for raison d’état see
Frederick Meinecke, Machiavellism (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1998) and Jonathon Haslam, No
Virtue Like Necessity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
34 On the importance of the text and his life see H. M. A. Keen-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer,
‘Introduction’, in H. M. A. Keen-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer (eds), François de Callières. The Art
of Diplomacy (New York: Leicester University Press, 1983), pp. 1–54.
35 Ibid., pp. 125–6.
36 Ibid., p. 139.
37 Jean Rousset de Missy, Mémoires sur le rang et la préséance entre les souverains de l’Europe
(Amsterdam: L’Honoré, 1746), p. 3.
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respect produce any diﬀerence. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no
less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.38
Nor was Vattel alone. Dickinson’s extensive study of the doctrine of the equality
of states, published in 1920, ascribed significant weight to the lectures of Thomas
Rutherforth, published in 1754–1756, two years before Vattel’s Law of Nations.39
Rutherforth argued along similar lines to Vattel: ‘The law of nations considers each
civil society as a moral person, and all the several societies as so many distinct
persons in a state of nature.’40
Two reservations must be entered about the status and nature of this argument.
First, it was counterfactual. It was counterfactual not just in the sense that Vattel
noted, namely that this normative equality stood in contrast to inequalities of power
or nature. It was counterfactual in that it did not accord with widespread percep-
tions and practices in his own day. Vattel knew this. That is evident in his comments
on the relationship between one small republic, his native Switzerland, and a
powerful kingdom, France.41 Yet this did not aﬀect the force of his argument which
was, as he explicitly stated, a natural law argument. Similarly, Rutherforth explicitly
rejected ‘mere usage’.42 Neither had any need to turn to an historic event, not even
the ‘famous peace of Westphalia’ as Vattel called it, in order to assert the principle
of equality. Relying primarily on a contingent historical fact, upon ‘mere usage’,
would have weakened their cause not strengthened it.43
A further obstacle to linking the peace of Westphalia with a general principle
of equality was eighteenth century perceptions of the Holy Roman Empire. Most
eighteenth century commentators did not perceive a conglomeration of indepen-
dent and equal states under the shadow of the empty shell of a former empire as
later interpretations would see it. That is consistent with the extensive survey of
eighteenth century German conceptions by Bernd Kremer. According to Kremer
the typical stance of eighteenth century German publicists was represented by the
assertion of Johann Jakob Moser in 1773: ‘If a German regent should allow the
title of sovereign to be bestowed upon him, the Imperial Court is fully authorised
to strike down such self-description as contrary to the Imperial Constitution.’44 A
little earlier Johann Jakob Schmauss sought to curtail the implications of the
Imperial Estates’ right of consultation by arguing that this no more made them
co-rulers than the estates’ right of consultation within the individual territories
made them co-rulers.45 The corollary of the supposed triumph of the principle of
the sovereign territorial state is, of course, the supposition that after 1648 the
Empire no longer qualified as a state. But Kremer argues that this involves a
projection backward of later concerns. The eighteenth century question in German
38 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), Preliminaries, p. 75.
39 Edwin DeWitt Dickinson, The Equality of States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920),
p. 85.
40 Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Bentham, 1756), p. 512.
41 Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 4, chap. 6, para. 79, pp. 695–6.
42 Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, vol. 2, p. 470.
43 Vattel has often been portrayed as a proto-positivist. For correction of this see Simone Zerbuchen,
‘Vattel’s law of nations and just war theory’, History of European Ideas, 35 (2009), pp. 409–10.
44 Quoted in Bernd Mathias Kremer, Der Westfälische Friede in der Deutung der Aufklärung (Tübingen:
Mohr, 1989), p. 68.
45 Ibid., p. 72.
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minds was not, had the Empire ceased to be a state, but did the territories qualify
as states, a question which was answered in the aﬃrmative but without assuming
this amounted to an assertion of the equality of all states.46
It was, moreover, not only the ambitious and competing rising powers within
the Empire that could cause a threat and elicit condemnation. Thus, another
eminent eighteenth century German publicist, Johann Stephan Pütter, concluded
his historical survey of the Empire with the crisis of the Bavarian succession and
the defeat of Habsburg schemes to acquire Bavaria and wreck the balance within
the empire in the process. Subsequent scheming after the formal end of the crisis
induced the formation of a ‘defensive League’, initially consisting of ‘the three
Electoral Courts of Saxony, Brandenburg, and Hanover’ which, according to
Pütter, ‘has only the preservation of the constitution for its object, which ought
to be held sacred, not only by the supreme Head, but by every individual Member
of the Empire’.47 Pütter concluded his account with eﬀusive praise of none other
than Frederick II of Prussia in his role as saviour of the Imperial constitution.48
The presumption here is not that the Empire was free of centrifugal, or
centralising, conflicts but that it was a viable, if complex, structure whose
constitutional provisions were meaningful. It was a presumption made by Edmund
Burke, on the understanding that others would share it, when he invoked the
condition of the Empire ‘not for an exact resemblance, but as a sort of middle
term, by which India might be approximated to our understandings, and if
possible to our feelings’.49
There is somewhat more evidence of a perception of the unusual significance of
the peace of Westphalia in the context of the genre of histories of treaties and
diplomacy that emerged in the wake of the peace. This was encouraged by the
publication of copies of the treaties of the peace and the increasingly commercial
dissemination of such texts as well as the professionalisation of diplomacy.50
Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, for example, confidently proclaimed in his Le droit de
l’Europe fondé sur les traits that practically nothing prior to Westphalia played any
significant role in contemporary Europe.51 Jean Dumont also began his Nouveau
recueil des traits of 1710 in 1648. However, the same author’s Corps universel
diplomatique, the text which dominated the field for much of the century, began in
800.52 Even where chronology might suggest pivotal importance of the peace
of Westphalia care needs to be taken. Thus, when Charles Jenkinson, later Earl of
46 Ibid., pp. 68–91.
47 John Stephen Pütter, An Historical Development of the Present Political Constitution of the German
Empire, vol. 3 (London: Payne, 1790), p. 223.
48 Ibid., pp. 223–4. See also, with reference to an earlier date, the assertion by John Campbell that the
King of Prussia ‘considers himself as the Guardian of the Germanick Constitution’, The Present
State of Europe (London: Thomas Longman, 1750), p. 139 and the depiction of the conflict in
Germany during the Seven Years War as a civil war by Israel Mauduit, Considerations on the Present
War in Germany (London: John Wilkie, 1760), p. 19, a tract described by Anderson as ‘the most
influential English pamphlet of the period’, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, p. 173.
49 In his speech on Fox’s India Bill (1783), in David P. Fidler and Jennifer M Welsh (eds), Empire and
Community. Edmund Burke’s Writings and Speeches on International Relations (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1999), p. 176. For French views see Joseph de Rayneval, Institutions du droit public
d’Allemagne (Leipzig: Maison des Orphelins et de Fromman, 1766), especially pp. 462–8.
50 On the production of histories of treaties see Mario Toscano, The History of Treaties and
International Politics (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1966).
51 Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, Collection complète des oeuvres, 5 (Aaalen: Scientia 1977), p. 238.
52 Toscano, The History of Treaties, pp. 60–6.
The Westphalian model and sovereign equality 649
Liverpool, began his compilation with 1648 he did so not because of the Peace of
Westphalia of October 1648 but because of the Treaty of Münster of January 1648
which set the seal on Dutch independence and because of the British interest in
‘raising an independent state in the Netherlands, out of the Austrian dominions;
which became at once the means of lessening the interest of that House, and of
raising up a firm and stable ally’.53 More broadly, as Iain Hampsher-Monk has
pointed out: ‘The historical periodization “Westphalian” requires caution. For
writers of Burke’s generation, the watershed treaty in establishing the new order of
state-integrity and a balance of power was the Peace of Utrecht (1713).’54
Continental commentators were more disposed to look to Westphalia. For those
directly aﬀected by the Thirty Years War and the peace that ended it anything less
would be surprising. Again, however, caution is needed. When the French diplomat
Joseph Rayneval described the peace of Westphalia as the basis of the ‘funda-
mental law of Europe’ he did so in the context of an account of a series of attempts
to put an end to a history of conflict and diversity that was coterminous with the
existence of the Holy Roman Empire. Rather than marking a revolutionary
breakthrough it brought some calm to the troubled empire, albeit without
extinguishing the longstanding animosities to which it was subject.55
In conclusion, almost none of the elements of the image of the peace of
Westphalia as an epoch making transition to a world of sovereign equal states
stands up to scrutiny let alone the concatenation required to generate that image.
The obstacles to it are clear: a predominantly hierarchical view of international
society in which so far as notions of equality were asserted at all they were derived
from natural law doctrines; the perceived persistence of a viable German Empire
rather than a collection of sovereign states; lack of consensus about the
periodisation of European history and the lack of any perception of a revolution-
ary transition let alone of one dating from 1648 and constituting a modern era in
some form or another. By the same token it is not diﬃcult to see what would
probably be needed to facilitate the emergence of the image: greater doctrinal
insistence on equality that could find firmer footing in diplomatic practice;
considerable slackening in the dominance of natural law arguments and the
emergence of a historical sociology of law; greater consensus about the universality
of a clear concept of sovereignty; the disappearance or marginalisation of
structures that would be seen as manifestly incompatible with the image; some
sense of a unified modern epoch in international relations. It was precisely such
53 Charles Jenkinson, A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Allaince, and Commerce between
Great-Britain and Other Powers (London: Debrett, 1785), p. 1. On the customary and misguided
conflation of Dutch independence and the peace of Westphalia see Osiander, ‘Sovereignty,
International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, p. 268.
54 Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘Edmund Burke’s Changing Justification for Intervention’, The Historical
Journal, 48 (2005), p. 66.
55 Rayneval, Institutions du droit public d’Allemagne, pp. 1–13, 59–69. For the caution expressed by
other French authors see Charles-Frédéric Necker de Custrin, Description du gouvernement present
du corps Germanique (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing 2009[1741]), pp. 290–6 and Louis-Pierre
Anquetil, Motifs des guerres et de traits de paix de la France pendant les règnes de Louis XIV, Louis
XV et Louis XVI (Paris: Lerguillez, 1798), pp. 60–4.
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developments that took place in nineteenth century, though unevenly, gathering
pace towards the end of the century but still facing considerable obstacles and
doctrinal resistance.56
Nineteenth and early twentieth century views
It is natural to look to the impact of the French Revolution and Napoleon as
an explanation of an abrupt transition. Martin Wight put it thus: ‘The levelling of
the international community was completed by the French revolutionary and
Napoleonic Wars.’57 While it is true that these upheavals were seen as putting an
end to at least elements of the old order, not least, of course, by bringing an end
to the Holy Roman Empire, the notion that they issued, either during these wars
or after, in the triumph of sovereign equality is dubious.58 Revolutionary rhetoric
of equality was almost immediately contrasted with French hegemonic ambitions
and the impact of Napoleon was ambiguous. The ambiguity was well put from the
perspective of the end of the nineteenth century by a German theorist: ‘An attempt
to revive the forms of the old Europe for the new Europe came from the man who
had reduced the old world to ruins. Vassalage appeared to Bonaparte as the
appropriate form to maintain in dependence some small principalities bestowed by
him on relatives and favourites.’59 Moreover, the Napoleonic system never lost a
sense of impermanence.60 Even more important, it was the settlement at the end of
the Napoleonic wars that shaped impressions of the international system for most
of the century.
As is well known, the Congress of Vienna showed little respect, either in the
conduct of the Congress or in its outcome for principled equality of states.61 It
produced what Gerry Simpson has aptly summarised as a form of ‘legalized
hierarchy’.62 It is true that the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand invoked the
principle of equality, but only as a ploy to win French access to the deliberations
of the Great Powers after which he promptly abandoned the idea.63 The fact that
he thought it worth invoking at all though is not without significance. Similarly,
56 The consolidation of the image was undoubtedly aided by other developments associated with the
Westphalian model. As noted above these are deliberately excluded from consideration here. It is
worth noting that one such development is the emergence of the concept of territoriality as central
to the modern state. Thus Georg Jellinek, who included territory as one of his three ‘elements’ of
the state claimed that the first text to pronounce territory to be essential to the concept of the state
did not appear until 1817: Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1929), p. 395.
57 Martin Wight, Systems of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 136.
58 Oddly, Reus-Smit quotes this with approval, The Moral Purpose of the State, p. 102. Amidst the
upheavals Georg Friedrich von Martens regarded whether or not the French Revolution would
inaugurate a new epoch, the fifth, in international law as an open question, Einleitung in das positive
Europäische Völkerrecht (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1796), p. 8.
59 Georg Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen (Goldbach: Keip 1996 [1882]), pp. 145–6.
60 As emphasised by Metternich. See Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1957), p. 21.
61 See the still valuable study by Genevieve Peterson, ‘Political Equality at the Congress of Vienna’,
Political Science Quarterly, 60 (1945), pp. 532–54.
62 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
pp. 67–76, 93–115.
63 Peterson, ‘Political Equality’, pp. 538–9 and 541–2; Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 151–2 and 167;
Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Grove, 1946), pp. 141–3.
The Westphalian model and sovereign equality 651
the British Foreign Minister Castlereagh made some concession to the notion of
equality in suggesting that the lesser powers should be provided with the pretence
of their participation and consent.64 The principle that animated the Congress, so
far as principle did at all, was well formulated long before the Congress met, at the
height of Napoleon’s power, by Friedrich Gentz:
In every well ordered state the collective body of citizens, and in every well ordered
commonwealth of nations the collective body of states should be equal in their rights, (that
is) their rights should be equally respected; but it by no means follows that they should have
the same rights, that is, rights of equal quality and value. True equality, and the only
equality attainable by legitimate means, consists, in both cases, in this, that the smallest as
well as the greatest is secured in the possession of his right, and that is can neither be
forced from him nor encroached upon by lawless power.65
This qualified sense of equality was quite compatible with hierarchy and was to
become a recurrent reference point in the arguments of those who were critical of
more expansive concepts of equality. Ironically, this qualified sense of equality
arguably could have been linked to 1648 but Gentz made no such move; producing
instead a nuanced interpretation of the peace of Westphalia that emphasised its
limitations.66
A less qualified notion of the principle of sovereign equality did gain ground
throughout the nineteenth century. One of the bluntest early assertions came from
Chief Justice Marshall in 1825: ‘No principle is more universally acknowledged,
than the perfect equality of nations.’67 But initially, where any argument was
oﬀered for this equality it took the form of the natural law argument already set
out by Vattel. Indeed Vattel’s argument was so influential that one late nineteenth
century author rehearsed it, including the claims about the equality of the giant
and the dwarf, without even bothering to mention Vattel by name.68 At about the
same time James Lorimer, the most prominent critic of the doctrine of equality,
complained of that ‘most baseless’ yet ‘prevalent theory of the equality of all
powers [. . .] which at the present day you will find set forth in all the books’. He
added that Heﬀter ‘who as a German might be expected to be free from the
confusion of mind on the subject of equality generally found in French writers
since the Revolution’ was in fact a prime example of such confusion.69 Arguments
for the principle were in fact quite diverse but typically not based on positive law.
The widely accepted view of the nineteenth century as the century of legal
positivism, let alone the legal positivism of Austin, is an oversimplification. As
Martti Koskenniemi has argued it is misleading to speak of the international
lawyers of this period as ‘“positivists” who were enthusiastic about “sover-
eignty”’.70 It is notable that when the self-avowed positivist Lassa Oppenheim
64 Peterson, ‘Political Equality’, pp. 536–7.
65 Friederich Gentz, Fragments upon the Balance of Power in Europe (London: Peltier, 1806), pp. 57–8.
66 Friederich Gentz, On the State of Europe before and after the French Revolution (London: Hatchard,
1802), pp. 10–13.
67 ‘The Antelope’, US Reports, 23 (1825), p. 122.
68 Giuseppe Carnazza-Amari, Traité de droit international public en temps de paix, vol. 1 (Paris: Larose,
1880), p. 379.
69 James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1883),
pp. 170–2. See also the extensive list of authors cited by Ernest Nys, Études de droit international
et de droit politique (Brussels: Alfred Castaigne, 1901), pp. 9–13.
70 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
p. 4.
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proclaimed ‘the downfall of the theory of the Law of Nature, which after many
hundreds of years has al last been shaken oﬀ during the second half of this century’
he struggled to find many unalloyed positivist accounts of international law,
identifying the ‘first real positivist treatise’ as a German text of 1874, Hall’s English
work of 1880 and then a cluster of texts appearing between 1895 and 1907.71
Nevertheless, there was an increasing disposition to turn from natural law to what
amounted to some kind of historical sociology. It is consistent with this trend that
the Swiss international lawyer and delegate to the Hague Conference of 1907, Max
Huber, produced the ‘first serious sketch for a historical sociology of law’ in
1910.72 From this perspective the historical record was no longer an uncertain
realm of contingency but could be construed as exhibiting evolutionary break-
throughs amongst which the peace of Westphalia was a potential candidate. That
possibility was arguably reinforced by the conception that international law was
strictly European in origin and in some respects in the extent of its application.
That supposition was embodied in the titles of two early influential texts: Klüber’s
Droit des gens moderne de l’Europe, first published in 1819, and Hefter’s Das
europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart auf den bisherigen Grundlagen, first pub-
lished in 1844.73 If international law was an evolutionary product of European law
and if the principle of equality was a key principle of that law then it made sense
to look for some point or period at which this principle had been adopted or had
crystallised in European public consciousness.
Principle and public conscience could be held up against the positive law and
diplomatic practice of a world of states that was still characterised by hierarchy
and by the legacy of the European concert that originated at Vienna. It was
precisely in this sense that Ernst Nys proclaimed the necessity ‘to denounce the
illegitimacy of the pretensions of the European concert’.74 Yet others could take
comfort from signs of resistance to the claims for hierarchy, including rights of
intervention and rights to regulate membership of the world of states through the
doctrine of constitutive recognition.75 The culmination of such trends came with
the Second Hague Conference of 1907. There an intense debate arose over the
composition of a proposed Permanent Court of Arbitral Justice, in which
considerations of the principled equality of states were prominent.76 The occasion
for the dispute was a proposal that while all states would have a right to appoint
a judge to the court only the judges of the great powers would sit permanently.
71 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, 1912), pp. 100–1.
72 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, p. 227. See also, Oliver Diggelmann, Anfänge der Völkkerechtssozi-
ologie (Zürich: Schultess, 2000).
73 Jean Louis Klüber, Droit des gens moderne de l’Europe (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1819) and August Wilhelm
Hefter, Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart auf den bisherigen Grundlagen (Berlin: Müller
1888 [1884]). On this trend see Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When was the Law of International Society Born?’,
Journal of the History of International Law, 2 (2000), pp. 37–8. The presumption has been extensively
criticised by Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also the work of Lauren Benton, most recently,
A Search for Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
74 Nys, Études, p. 46.
75 Neither of these aspects can be followed up here but see Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of
Intervention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 1–51 and Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the
Earth (New York: Telos, 2003), pp. 304–8.
76 See Simpson, Great Powers, pp. 132–64 and Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose, 140–5.
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Against this proposal, the Brazilian delegate, Rui Barbosa, launched an impas-
sioned defence of equality, protesting ‘that if the States excluded from the First
Peace Conference have been invited to the Second, it is not with a view to having
them solemnly sign an act derogatory to their sovereignty by reducing them to a
scale of classification which the more powerful nations would like to have
recognized.’77 The sovereign equality demanded by Barbosa went far beyond the
qualified equality conceded at the beginning of the preceding century by Gentz.
For Barbosa it was necessary not only that all have the same right but also that
all should exercise that right equally. Conversely, ‘If, perforce, we insist upon
referring to this condition of things as conditions of exercise, it will certainly be
necessary to confess that there are conditions of exercise that may aﬀect the very
existence of the right and annul that right. The conditions of exercise respect the
equality of right only when they are equal for those possessing the right.’78 The
bare right to appoint judges was worthless unless all judges enjoyed the same
conditions of that appointment, that is, unless they all sat for the same period.
Such doctrines were meant to apply, of course, only amongst the civilised states
of Europe and by extension the Americas, with a handful of recent exceptions on
other continents. A kind of doctrinal apartheid helped to maintain the contrast
between a world of sovereign states and a world of colonies, protectorates and
terra nullius. Within the heart of Europe the apparent triumph of nationalism and
especially German unification seemed to simplify the mental map. German jurists
remained sensitive to the complexities and ambiguities of the federal Reich founded
in 1871 but such concerns increasingly came to be seen as archaic.79
While any one of these developments, the diminution of overt doctrines of
natural law and the emergence of a historical sociology of law, doctrinal insistence
on the equality of states and claims made on the diplomatic stage, the apparent
simplification of the juristic map of the world, could promote the association of
sovereign equality and Westphalia, the combination of them probably accounts for
the linkage which became a central element of the Westphalian model. For it is
precisely towards the end of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the
twentieth that linkage of Westphalia and sovereign equality comes to be asserted
typically in clipped formulations devoid of either supporting commentary or
quotation from the treaties in which sovereign equality was supposedly enshrined.
Thus T. J. Lawrence bluntly asserted that ‘The principles of the territorial
character of sovereignty and the equality of states before the law were involved in
the arrangements it made.’80 At the turn of the century the American jurist and
diplomat Hannis Taylor asserted ‘that all states are formally equal and that
territory and jurisdication are coextensive – was made the basis of the settlement
embodied in the Peace of Westphalia’.81 Slightly earlier the Frenchman Frantz
77 James Brown Scott (ed.), The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. The Conference of 1907,
vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 620. The majority of those excluded from the
First Conference but present at the Second were Latin American, Simpson, Great Powers, p. 135.
78 Scott (ed.), The Proceedings, p. 628.
79 See the judgement of Rupert Emerson that they were ‘disguising the new as adequately as possible
in the juristic trappings of the old’, State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1928), p. 128.
80 T. J. Lawrence, Essays on Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law (Cambridge:
Deighton, 1885), p. 206.
81 Hannis Taylor, A Treatise of International Public Law (Chicago: Callaghan, 1901), p. xv.
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Despagnet proclaimed that Westphalia established ‘the basis of the modern
doctrine of international law’ including ‘the principle of the juridical equality of
states’.82 Another Frenchman praised Westphalia for bringing forth the ‘principle
of the independence and equality of sovereign states’.83 Lassa Oppenheim added
that with the Peace of Westphalia the ‘theory of the unity of the civilised world
under the German Emperor and the Pope as its temporal and spiritual heads was
buried for ever. A multitude of recognised independent States formed now a
community on the basis of equality of all its members.’84 Assertions of this nature
were repeated with such frequency that by the end of the 1920s an Italian, Andrea
Rapisardi Mirabelli, devoted a doctorate to the Peace of Westphalia – a text upon
which Leo Gross drew heavily – and proclaimed that Westphalia established the
equality of states and ‘territorial sovereignty’ as the ‘veritable essence of the new
order of things’.85 For Mirabelli Westphalia was not the product of the vision or
prudence of the authors of the treaties but an historical necessity. Given the rise
of nationalism and the fragmentation of Europe the only alternative to war, since
the restoration of some kind of superior authority was inconceivable, was the
Westphalian system.86
It is evidence of the unsettled nature of the debate that both the general trends
of the age and the specific significance of the dispute at the Hague elicited quite
diverse judgements. Thus, to many commentators of this period, some kind of
superior authority was conceivable, though the conclusions they drew from this in
terms of Westphalia and sovereign equality varied. In part this depended upon
what they saw as the challenge to the doctrine of equality. There were two distinct
challenges, though they could be elided. The first was the European concert or
system of great powers. As already indicated Ernst Nys saw the European concert,
rooted in the settlement at the end of the Napoleonic wars as a threat to the
equality consecrated at Westphalia and as something that was inherently illegiti-
mate.87 Some even took the debate about equality and the proposed Permanent
Court at the Hague as a worrying sign of an attempt to revive the detested Holy
Alliance.88 The second challenge, sometimes fused with the tradition of the
European concert, came from the growth of international agreements of which the
Hague formed a prominent part. Thus Lawrence had already concluded before
the Second Hague Conference that recent developments ‘can have no other
meaning than that the doctrine of Equality is becoming obsolete and must be
superseded by the doctrine that a Primacy with regard to some important matters
is vested in the foremost powers of the civilized world. Europe is working round
again to the old notion of a common superior, not indeed a Pope or an Emperor,
but a Committee, a body of representative of her leading states.’89 After the Second
Hague Conference he again proclaimed the imminent end of equality but now on
82 Frantz Despagnet, Cours de droit international public (Paris: Larose, 1894), pp. 17–8.
83 Charles Dupuis, Le principe d’équilibre et la concert européen (Paris: Perrin, 1909), p. 20.
84 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, 1905), p. 60.
85 Andrea Rapisardi Mirabelli, Le Congrès de Westphalie (Leyden: Brill, 1929), pp. 14–5.
86 Mirabelli, Le Congrès, p. 29.
87 Nys, Études, pp. 1–46.
88 Max Huber, ‘Die Gleichheit der Staaten’, in F. Berolzheimer (ed.), Rechtswissenschaftliche Beiträge
(Stuttgart: Enke, 1909), p. 118.
89 T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 3rd edition (Boston: Heath, 1908), p. 242. The
Preface is dated 1900.
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the grounds that ‘the society of nations has become self-conscious, and is preparing
itself for the performance of legislative, administrative, and judicial functions’.90 In
terms of both challenges however the notion that equality was threatened –
whether this was feared or welcomed – was thought to be compatible with the
notion that the principle of sovereign equality had been established at Westphalia
and had lasted, either to the end of the eighteenth century or until the end of the
nineteenth. In both cases the political reality of hierarchy was perceived as resistant
to what was taken as the Westphalian promise.
A further barrier came from a group who did not welcome the claims made for
equality at the Hague, raised principled objections to equality or at least equality
in its unqualified form and cast doubt on the historiography that ascribed
sovereign equality to Westphalia. Thus, reflecting on the Hague Conference,
Frederick Charles Hicks complained that the presumption of equality, and more
specifically equality in voting, had been an arbitrary decision by the Russian Czar.
His displeasure was clear in his observation that: ‘Nevertheless, no unicameral
legislative assembly in the world’s history has been organized in a similar manner
where not only do all units, great or small, have equal voting power but practical
unanimity is required in order to carry a measure.’91 Nor did he hesitate to quote
a report of the London Times referring to Barbosa’s ‘“fierce (farouche) exposition”
of the extreme conception of the equality of all states and governments’ and
drawing an analogy between such beliefs and ‘the old principle of the Polish
veto’.92
In the most substantive study of the period devoted to the equality of states
Edwin de Witt Dickinson insisted that discussion of the issue was typically
characterised by a ‘remarkable confusion of thought and of statement’.93 The
confusion amounted to a failure to distinguish between the conception of equality
that Gentz held to be the only meaningful and practical one and the conception
of equality that Barbosa held to be the only conceivable one. As Dickinson put
it the distinction lay between equal ‘protection of the law or equality before
the law’ and an ‘equal capacity for rights’.94 By the latter he meant the idea that
each legal subject, here states, was supposed to have exactly the same rights
and not merely the idea that each legal subject should have such rights as it
happened to have protected. He did not reject ‘equal capacity of rights’ entirely
but described it as an aspiration that properly followed the firm establishment
of ‘equality before the law’. In international doctrine, however, he complained
that this natural course of development had been inverted because of the
‘extraordinary influence of text-writers upon the law of nations in its formative
period’.95
As that statement suggests Dickinson did not believe the doctrine of equal
capacity for rights could be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia. Indeed he
claimed that even in the nineteenth century there ‘has been much less said about
90 T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 6th edition (Boston: Heath, 1910), p. 288.
91 Frederick Charles Hicks, ‘The Equality of States at the Hague Conferences’, American Journal of
International Law, 2 (1908), p. 538.
92 Hicks, ‘The Equality of States’, p. 539.
93 Dickinson, The Equality of States, p. 5.
94 Ibid., p. 4.
95 Ibid., p. 5.
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the equality of nations outside the treatises of the publicists than one might
reasonably expect’.96 Scepticism about the Westphalian provenance of the doctrine
was also evident in a review of Mirabelli’s text. There the reviewer was largely
sympathetic, with exception of one major flaw:
A study of American scholars in the field might have eliminated, for instance, such
mistakes as the oft-repeated assumption that the Peace of Westphalia was based upon the
theory of the complete equality of states [. . .] The error of asserting that the Peace of
Westphalia established equality of states in a family of nations has been too often repeated
to be readily corrected, and it is to be regretted that the same illusion is found in the
dissertation under review.97
For correction of the error he recommended Dickinson who did indeed point out
that the peace expressly provided ‘for important inequalities of legal capacity in the
reconstituted community of nations’.98
Yet the reviewer was right that repetition of the error was making it diﬃcult
to correct. It was still possible to try to do so. There was suﬃcient scepticism about
the unqualified principle of state equality to call into question its plausibility and
desirability as a normative principle as well as to question the linkage of sovereign
equality and the Peace of Westphalia. It was not to be until after the Second World
War that the linkage acquired such a hold, that, at least until recently, it became
nigh on unquestionable.
Mid to late twentieth century views
The debate about equality flared up again at the end of the Second World War,
especially in the San Francisco conference that established the UN Charter. That
it would do so had been evident as far back as the 1942 Declaration by UN where
even in matters of protocol the precedence of the Great Powers was asserted to the
annoyance of the lesser powers.99 On the other hand the Declaration of the
Moscow Conference of 1943 proclaimed the ‘necessity of establishing at the earliest
possible date a general international organization, based on the sovereign equality
of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and
small’.100 Some care was even taken in other clauses of the Declaration to mitigate
the appearance of great power hegemony.101 Nevertheless it was impossible to
avoid the clash between great power hegemony, built into the Yalta voting
formula, and the principle of sovereign equality at the San Francisco conference.102
At the end of the day it was the blunt insistence by the great powers that there
96 Ibid., p. 153.
97 Kenneth Cosgrove, ‘Review of Le Congrès de Westphalie by Andrea Rapisardi Mirabelli, American
Journal of International Law, 25 (1931), pp. 184–5.
98 Dickinson, The Equality of States, p. 233.
99 See Ruth B. Russell, A History of the UN Charter. The Role of the US 1940–1945 (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 51–6.
100 Quoted in Russell, A History, p. 134.
101 Russell, A History, p. 135.
102 In addition to Russell, A History, see also Simpson, Great Powers, pp. 165–93, Stephen C.
Schlesinger, Act of Creation (Boulder: Westview, 2003), though focusing on disputes between the
great powers, and Djura Nincic, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and Practice of the UN
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1970), especially pp. 36–135.
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could be an international organisation with a great power veto, or no international
organisation at all, that determined the outcome of the principled argument. As the
Prime Minister of New Zealand put it, ‘we felt that it was not, in the last degree,
a question of the rule of unanimity or a question of the veto, whichever name we
care to call it – it was a question of organization; a new world organization or no
world organization’.103 It was still necessary though to provide some reassurance,
or at least face-saving facade, for the smaller powers. The reassurance came in the
form of the argument that the great powers should have special rights on the
grounds of their special responsibilities and that they would exercise the former
in exceptional cases with due regard to the interests of the wider community of
states.104 In the language of Dickinson this meant that in matters of the equality
of capacity of rights, there would be no equality. Interestingly, the Mexican
delegate, García Robles saw in this same distinction ‘the juridical principle of
correlation between powers and duties which safeguards the basic principle of
equal rights of all states’.105 The doctrine of sovereign equality was to be salvaged
amidst its open denial. Before long capacity for rights as a condition for any kind
of equality was to be dismissed; being treated as an illegitimate criterion. In
Resolution 1514 of 1960 the UN General Assembly proclaimed: ‘Inadequacy of
political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a
pretext for delaying independence.’106 Following a similar logic, the new UN
abandoned the practice of the League of Nations of making successful applications
for membership dependent upon capacity for self-defence.107
In the post-war world the discrepancy between the doctrine of equality and the
real distribution of powers was as great, if not greater, than ever. To John Herz
it had reached ‘fantastic proportions’.108 To Robert Jackson manifest lack of
capacity suggested the need to ask what meaning sovereignty could conceivably
have.109 Yet the doctrine of equality, the doctrine of Vattel and the equality of the
dwarf and the giant, increasingly triumphed in the sense that the normative
presumption in favour of equality largely discredited principled arguments for
hierarchy.110 It was, moreover, an undiﬀerentiated concept of equality that
triumphed; one that owed more to the logic of Barbosa than that of Gentz and
Dickinson.
It was this changing world in which Leo Gross published his article on the
significance of the peace of Westphalia. There is nothing of significance in his
account of the peace and its supposed significance that cannot be found earlier,
103 Documents of the UN Conference on International Organization, vol. 11 (London: UN Information
Organizations, 1945), p. 170.
104 There were, of course, numerous other issues. See Simpson, Great Powers, pp. 165–93.
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106 Quoted in William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
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107 As noted by John H. Herz, Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959),
p. 78.
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A. A. Said (ed.), Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance (Englewood Cliﬀs:
Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 117.
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
110 For an account of the triumph and its significance see Allan James, ‘The Equality of States:
Contemporary Manifestations of an Ancient Doctrine’, Review of International Studies, 18 (1992),
pp. 377–91.
658 Peter M. R. Stirk
especially in the work of Mirabelli which Gross refereed to so frequently. It is even
possible to find, in a text published five years earlier by an Italian lawyer, Angelo
Sereni, the following lament: ‘it is high time to revise the current opinion that the
Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, definitely established the full and exclusive right of
the various independent European states over their territories. In most cases, their
power was neither absolute nor exclusive nor equal over all parts of their
territory’.111 Sereni and his reservations about Westphalia were not remembered or
extensively quoted in the following decades. Leo Gross’s article became the
standard reference point. There was no flurry of publications calling into question
the doctrine of equality as there had been in the 1920s. It was no longer the case
that it was merely diﬃcult to correct the error of Mirablli and Gross, it was the
case that almost no one even tried to. It is notable that a series of articles on the
equality of states published in the Political Science Quarterly, beginning in 1945, set
out from the Congress of Vienna and that it concluded with a two-part article by
Adolf Lande entitled ‘Revindication of the Principle of Legal Equality of States,
1871–1914’.112 The presumption was that the principle of equality had been
dominant before it was overturned at Vienna and had been reasserted. The purpose
of the article was evident in the final sentence in which Lande asserted that the
‘decay of the European Concert [. . .] conforms with the essential character of our
international society’ and warned both statesmen and commentators against
‘drawing too hasty conclusions from the present position of the Great Powers in
regard to the validity of the principle of the legal equality of states’.113
Conclusion
It has been argued that the claim that the sovereign equality of states was in any
way established at the peace of Westphalia is wrong. Seventeenth and eighteenth
century international society was essentially hierarchical in the minds of most
statesmen and commentators. When the principle of equality did appear it was
counterfactual and was espoused on the basis of natural law. The nineteenth
century began with assertions of hierarchy, though there were signs of concessions
to a qualified conception of equality. Only gradually, and not significantly until the
end of the century did the abstract principle of equality, increasingly unqualified,
become widespread and come to be linked with Westphalia. Even then and well
into the interwar years both the principle and the linkage of sovereign equality and
Westphalia met with strong opposition. Only after the Second World War,
especially through the seminal article of Leo Gross, did the linkage become the
accepted and for many year uncriticised norm. Gross’s article is, then, bad history
but it is possible to account for why this bad history gained hold when it did.
Yet this is not the only objection to Gross’s account and perhaps not even the
most important objection. For, as the case of Adolf Lande’s article suggests, the
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standard account of sovereign equality and Westphalia sets up a norm that fails to
account for the behaviour of states and often for the justification of the behaviour.
These deviations are then accounted for in terms of the predominance of power
over ideas and the ideas, which are presumed to be the standard norm even for
statesmen who deviate from them, must then be exposed as expressions of
hypocrisy. It is precisely this logic that it is deployed by Stephen Krasner and is
evident in his subtitle: Organized Hypocrisy. According to Krasner his account of
the reality of the Westphalian model and the behaviour of states demonstrates that
‘the logics of consequences dominate the logics of appropriateness’.114 Now,
Krasner’s book goes far beyond the narrow focus on sovereign equality adopted
here, but his own logic is quite plausible and consistent with respect to this focus
if, and only if, the presumption of the dominance of the norm of sovereign equality
is accepted. For most of the history considered here it has either not been accepted
at all or has been contested. Behaviour deviant from the norm of sovereign
equality, then, need not signify hypocrisy but simply diﬀerent, non-egalitarian,
norms. Moreover, it is arguable that the current dominance of the norm of
sovereign equality and neglect of principled arguments for inequality do not serve
us well.
That is suggested by the wide ranging discussion of hierarchy in the context of
the idea of American hegemony. As Ian Clark has pointed out the fashionable
invocation of American hegemony ‘seldom rests on anything more than a view of
US primacy, namely that the system is now unipolar, and the US enjoys an
unprecedented preponderance of material resources within it’.115 Against this
understanding of hegemony Clark sets the idea of hegemony as ‘an institutionalized
practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state with the resources
to lead’.116 Similarly, Torbjørn Knutsen has argued that throughout history
hegemony has involved ‘pre-eminence which is sustained by a shared understanding
among social actors of the values, norms, rules and laws of political interaction; of
patterns of authority and the allocation of status and prestige, responsibilities and
privileges’.117 Such statements are closer to the language of the great powers at San
Francisoco, Dickinson, Barboasa’s opponents at the Hague, Gentz, Kaunitz and
even those irritated French negotiators of the peace of Westphalia than to the
language of Leo Gross in 1948. The final reason then for seeing the linkage of
Westphalia and sovereign equality as what it is, a relatively recent and initially
contested product of history, is that it gives us access to a far richer vocabulary for
understanding not only the past but also the present.
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